We consider the problem of designing (or augmenting) an electric power system at a minimum cost such that it satisfies the -survivability criterion. This survivability criterion is a generalization of the well-known criterion, and it requires that at least fraction of the steady-state demand be met after failures of components, for . The network design problem adds another level of complexity to the notoriously hard contingency analysis problem, since the contingency analysis is only one of the requirements for the design optimization problem. We present a mixed-integer programming formulation of this problem that takes into account both transmission and generation expansion. We propose an algorithm that can avoid combinatorial explosion in the number of contingencies, by seeking vulnerabilities in intermediary solutions and constraining the design space accordingly. Our approach is built on our ability to identify such system vulnerabilities quickly. Our empirical studies on modified instances of the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 57-bus systems show the effectiveness of our methods. We were able to solve the transmission and generation expansion problems for in approximately 30 min, while other approaches failed to provide a solution at the end of 2 h.
increased reliance on electricity breeds far and wide ramifications for a blackout. While minimizing the likelihood of any blackout is a laudable goal, this will inevitably come at an economic cost. A partial remedy for increasing costs is to take into account both the likelihood of an event and severity of its consequences in the planning phase. This concept is adopted in Transmission Planning Standards (TPL-001-0.1, TPL-002-0b, TPL-003-0b, TPL-004-0a [1] ), defined by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). According to these standards, if only a single element is lost ( contingency), the system must be able to stabilize without any loss-of-load. In the case of simultaneous failures ( contingency), the system still has to restore stability, but a limited loss-of-load is allowed.
While contingency analysis, as a concept, is simple, algorithmically it is far from trivial. Despite its difficulty, the critical importance of the problem has drawn a lot of interest, and significant progress has been made over the last decade. In particular, optimization methods have been proposed to replace enumerative approaches that rely on verifying feasibility on each state of a given list of contingencies. For example, optimization methods are used to find small groups of lines whose failure can cause a severe blackout or a large loss-of-load [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . contingencies were also studied in optimal power flow models [7] [8] [9] and unit commitment problems [10] using a single bus model. The methods used in [6] , [9] , and [10] are all based on a bilevel programming approach, which is the main method used for network inhibition/interdiction problems. Probability analysis [11] , limitations on generation and line capacity [12] , swarm optimization [13] , and methods based on topological characteristics of power grids [14] have been used for vulnerability analysis. Other approaches for contingency analysis are reviewed in [15] and [16] . Recently, more efficient approaches have been developed for contingency analysis. In [17] , impact and overload tracking structure algorithms were used to effectively detect the small fraction of the contingency set that result in violations. Similarly, a stochastic "random chemistry" algorithm in [18] was used to identify large collections of multiple contingencies that initiate large cascading failures. Lastly, a nonheuristic algorithm based on iterative bounding and successive pruning was developed in [19] to quickly detect contingencies.
The great strides in contingency analysis over the last decade have established the basis for higher objectives. In this paper, we consider the transmission and generation expansion planning (TGEP) problem with contingency constraints. Our goal is to design (or augment) a power system at a minimum cost to satisfy contingency constraints. We formalize the contingency 0885-8950 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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requirements with the -criterion, where is a parameter vector that specifies allowable loss-of-load, for each contingency size, as a fraction of total system demand. More specifically, this criterion requires that for any contingency of size , at least fraction of the total demand must be satisfied. Following NERC's standards, for the no-contingency state and contingencies of size one , no loss-of-load is allowed (i.e., ); for multiple failure contingencies , a small fraction of total load demand can be shed (i.e.,
). We want to stress that this paper, as well as the great majority of the optimization literature on contingency analysis, is based on steady-state analysis, ignoring the potential effects of system dynamics. While incorporating the dynamics is practically important, it is beyond the scope of this paper, and we restrict our attention to steady-state analysis using a direct current power flow model.
To understand the complexity of the TGEP, one should observe that contingency analysis, a difficult combinatorial optimization problem by itself, is only one of the prerequisite steps in solving TGEP; we must also address network design issues. Our approach is built on our ability to solve the contingency analysis problem efficiently so that it can be embedded in a broader framework. We begin by formulating a mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP) to model TGEP that explicitly includes multiple states representing each of the possible contingency states and, for each of these contingency states, contains the corresponding generation and flow constraints to ensure that at least fraction of the demand can be met. Such an enumerative approach, however, becomes computationally intractable even for moderate values of system size and maximum contingency-size budget , since the number of states grows with . Furthermore, it should be noted that contingency analysis for TGEP requires looking at higher values of , compared with contingency analysis for shorter term problems. The reason is that, in long-term problems, known longterm outages (planned or unplanned) contribute to , whereas in shorter term problems they do not. For instance, for dayahead planning, we will know the unavailable system components in advance, remove them from the system, and then we will perform contingency analysis for unexpected failures in the remaining system. However, for long-term problems such as TGEP, we want to design a system such that a feasible direct current optimal power flow (DCOPF) exists for any combination of planned and unplanned outages. This forces us to look at higher values of , which makes enumerative approaches prohibitively expensive, even when state of the art high performance computing platforms are available.
To overcome this challenge, we propose two cutting plane algorithms, one based on a direct application of Benders decomposition method to check the load satisfaction of each contingency state explicitly and another based on an implicit contingency screening (ICS) algorithm, which solves bilevel separation problems to determine the worst-case loss-of-load for each contingency size . The ICS algorithm implicitly identifies worst-case contingencies without explicitly evaluating all contingency states and generates additional constraints, corresponding to Benders feasibility constraints, to exclude solutions that are infeasible under the identified worstcase contingencies. This approach avoids the prohibitive cost of generating a constraint for every combination of failures, by only identifying relevant combinations as needed. As the computational experiments show, this reduction to only relevant contingencies makes a tremendous impact on the scalability of the algorithm.
We applied these approaches to the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 57-bus systems. Computational results show the scalability of the ICS algorithm. We were able to solve the TGEP problem for up to in approximately 30 min, while explicit enumeration approaches, e.g., extensive form and Benders decomposition, failed to provide any solutions at the end of 2 h. We observed that the key to our success was our ability to avoid looking at all individual vulnerabilities, and only a few iterations (vulnerability searches) are enough to find a provably optimal solution.
A survey of earlier work on transmission and generation expansion problems can be found in [20] . Recently, especially after the 2003 Northeast American blackout, security, stability, and reliability issues have become major concerns in modern power systems. Our earlier results were presented in [21] and [22] . The work in [23] and [24] addressed the defense protection of power system, and they analyzed the interaction between a power system defender and a terrorist who seeks to disrupt system operations. The authors of [25] [26] [27] studied the contingency criteria by stochastic programming and integer programming approaches. The work in [24] and [28] proposed a multilevel mixed-integer programming models for transmission expansion. Most of the work in this area, however, is restricted to the contingency criteria, which does not properly address the need to anticipate multiple concurrent failures. Additionally, the proposed models cannot be directly extended for multiple concurrent failures. Furthermore, they only consider transmission expansion, and they only consider failure of transmission elements, not considering the failure of generators.
The generation expansion problem has recently been studied in [29] . Transmission expansion and generation expansion planning problems have also been studied in a unified model [30] . Integration of renewable energy resources was taken into account in generation and transmission expansion planning by [29] [30] [31] . However, none of these studies consider the contingency criteria in the case of failures of both generating unit and transmission elements.
II. MODELS

A. Nomenclature
Sets and indices
Set of buses (indexed by
).
Set of all contingency states, over existing and candidate elements, with exactly failures (indexed by ).
Set of all contingency states, over existing and candidate elements, with or fewer failures, (indexed by ).
Number of failed element(s) in contingency .
Set of generating units (indexed by ).
Set of generating units at bus (indexed by ).
Set of transmission elements (indexed by ).
Set of transmission elements oriented into bus .
Set of transmission elements oriented out of bus .
Tail/head (bus no.) of transmission element .
Parameters
Maximum contingency size under consideration. In any contingency state the number of failures, i.e., the number of system elements in a contingency, is between 0 and .
Investment cost of transmission element .
Investment cost of generating unit .
Marginal production cost of generating unit .
Maximum capacity of generating unit .
Electrical susceptance of transmission element .
Capacity of transmission element .
Electricity load demand at bus .
Total electricity load demand across all buses .
Big M value for transmission element .
Weighting factor to make investment cost and operating cost comparable.
Total number of transmission elements and generating units, .
Fraction of load demand that can be shed given size contingencies, for all .
Binary parameter that is 1 if generating unit is part of the contingency state and 0 otherwise.
Binary parameter that is 1 if transmission element is part of the contingency state and 0 otherwise.
Vector that concatenates and variables.
Decision variables
Binary variable that is 1 if generating unit is added and 0 otherwise.
Binary variable that is 1 if transmission element is added and 0 otherwise.
Power flow on transmission element .
Power output of generating unit .
Loss-of-load at bus .
Phase angle of bus .
Binary variable that is 1 if generating unit is selected to be in the contingency and 0 otherwise.
Binary variable that is 1 if transmission element is selected to be in the contingency and 0 otherwise.
Power flow for transmission element for contingency state .
Power output of generating unit for contingency state .
Loss of load at bus for contingency state .
Phase angle of bus for contingency state .
For a contingency state and denote that generating unit and transmission element fail in this state, respectively. Conversely, and denote that both these two elements are available. Thus, for denoting the no-contingency state, we have and for all and .
B. Transmission and Generation Expansion Model
Here, we extend the standard TGEP problem to include contingency constraints. For brevity of presentation, we treat all power system elements, including existing ones, as candidates for addition to the system. For an existing element, the investment cost is set to 0 and the corresponding investment decisions fixed at 1. Once the network design decisions are made, each element selected for addition becomes available in all contingency states and , unless it is part of a given contingency. Consistent with the NERC reliability standards, in the no-contingency state and the single contingency state , no loss-of-load is allowed, thus we set . For larger contingency states, e.g., , the total loss-of-load is limited by the threshold . We assume that for all . The MINLP model for TGEP is formulated as follows:
In all subsequent formulations, unless otherwise specified, the indices , and are elements of their corresponding sets, i.e., , and . The objective (1a) is to minimize the total transmission and generation investment cost plus the weighted operating cost in the no-contingency state . Note that our formulation does not take into account the operational costs during a contingency state. There are two reasons for this. First, contingencies have low likelihood, and thus the operational costs during such events are negligible. The real financial burden of a contingency shows itself when the contingency leads to a blackout, which brings us to the second reason: the primary goal during a contingency is to keep the system intact as opposed to minimizing operational costs, since the cost of system failure is likely to be significantly higher than any operational cost. Constraints (1b) are conservation of flow requirements for each bus and contingency pair. For any transmission element that is operational, Kirchhoff's voltage law must be enforced by (1c). Power flow on transmission element is governed by thermal capacity constraints (1d). For each contingency state, the power output of a generating unit must satisfy the upper bound given by (1e). Constraints (1f) dictate that the total loss-of-load in the system cannot exceed fraction of the total system load, that is, at least of demand must be satisfied. Constraints (1g) restrict the loss-of-load at each bus to be at most the total demand at the bus.
Observe that constraints (1b)-(1g) are specific to a particular contingency state, that is, for a given contingency state , the transmission and generation element(s) in the contingency have zero capacity. In the no-contingency state , all invested transmission elements and generating units are available for the DCOPF problem.
III. SOLUTION APPROACHES
Replacing constraints (1c) by
where is a sufficiently large constant, transforms formulation (1) to a MILP, which we refer to as the extensive form (EF). EF will typically have an extremely large number of variables and constraints because it grows with the number of contingency states, which increases exponentially with and . For large power systems and/or a contingency greater than one, EF rapidly becomes computationally intractable for increasing system size and increasing contingency size . In the following sections, we modify this formulation and present cutting plane algorithms for solving the reformulated problem.
A. Benders Decomposition
We begin by presenting an alternative formulation with only binary variables but possibly an extremely large number of constraints. We use linear programming duality to generate valid inequalities for the projection of the natural formulation onto the space of the variables. In essence, we use a variant of Benders Decomposition, in which we only generate valid inequalities corresponding to "feasibility" cuts.
For a given contingency state , capacity expansion vector , and contingency state vector , we solve the following linear program, primal subproblem , to compute a DCOPF that minimizes total loss-of-load:
In this formulation, the objective (4a) is to minimize total loss-of-load by adjusting the flow, phase angles, and power generation, given the prescribed capacity expansion decision and contingency vector , corresponding to scenario . Letting be the optimal objective value of (4), if , there does not exist a feasible dc power flow satisfying at least fraction of total demand. Alternatively, if , there exists a power flow that can satisfy at least of total demand. Variables in parentheses on the left-hand side of the constraints in (4) denote the corresponding dual variables. In turn, we can formulate the dual of this problem as follows:
subject to constraints corresponding to primal variables . Since PSP has a finite optimal solution value (in the worst case, all load will be shed), DSP also has a finite optimal solution value, and, by strong duality, the optimal solutions coincide. Since has a finite optimal solution value, it also has an optimal extreme point. Thus, we can reformulate as follows:
where is the set of extreme points corresponding to the polyhedron characterized by dual constraints based on (4) for primal variables . The constraint should be satisfied for all . Thus contingency feasibility conditions can be defined as follows:
Since the objective is to minimize total investment cost and operating cost in the no-contingency state , we enforce all constraints for state 0 explicitly. For all other contingency states , constraint set (6) ensures that at least fraction of the total demand is satisfied. The reformulation of (1) is given as
The number of constraints in formulation (1) grows exponentially with the problem size, so we solve it via Benders Decomposition (BD). We briefly outline BD below. For a detailed treatment of BD, please refer to [32] .
Let be the iteration number and let the initial RMP be problem (7) without any (7b) constraints. Let be a concatenation of the expansion variables in the th iteration. By using a Benders reformulation, we are able to decompose the extremely large formulation (1) into a master problem and multiple subproblems (one for each contingency state). In theory, this enables us to solve larger instances, which would not be possible by a direct solution of EF. However, the extremely large number of contingency states makes direct application of Benders ineffective for large power systems and/or a nontrivial contingency budget (i.e.,
Algorithm 1 Benders Decomposition (BD)
). In Section III-B, we develop a custom cutting plane algorithm that evaluates all possible contingency states implicitly using a bilevel separation oracle.
B. Implicit Contingency Screening
The size of most power systems in operation (typically thousands of generating units and transmission elements) may preclude direct solution of (1). Even using a decomposition algorithm (e.g., BD) may not be feasible because each contingency state must be considered explicitly. Our goal is to instead use a separation oracle that implicitly evaluates all contingency states and either identifies a violated one (a contingency with failures (for all ) that cannot be survived by the current power system design) or provides a certificate that no such contingency exists. If such a contingency exists, we use this contingency to generate a violated Benders feasibility cut, as described in the previous section, for the RMP. If no such contingency exists, then the current solution is optimal, and we terminate the algorithm.
1) Power System Inhibition Problem (PSIP): Given a capacity expansion decision , the PSIP can be used to determine the worst-case loss-of-load under any contingency with failures, for all . In this bilevel program, the upper level decisions correspond to binary contingency selection decisions and the lower level decisions correspond to recourse power flow, generation scheduling, and load shedding decisions relative to the capacity expansion decision and the given contingency state, prescribed by .
Note that, in the prior model, was an input parameter, whereas in this formulation we are now selecting the elements of the contingency, with becoming a vector of decision variables. For clarity of exposition, the superscript corresponding to variables and has been removed, as the contingency state is not pre-specified, but rather part of the decision making process within the PSIP for all . PSIP is given as follows:
The objective (8a) is to maximize the minimum loss-of-load. For a given contingency state defined by , the objective of the power system operator (the inner minimization problem) is to determine the DCOPF such that the loss-of-load is minimized. Constraint (8b) is a budget constraint limiting the number of power system elements that can be in the contingency. Constraints (8c) are standard flow conservation constraints. Constraints (8d) and (8e) together enforce Kirchhoff's voltage law, for active transmission elements. Constraints (8f) and (8g) are constraints associated with the capacity of each transmission element. Constraints (8h) limit the maximum capacity of each generating unit. If a generating unit is not part of the contingency (i.e., ), then the maximum capacity of the generating unit is enforced, if the unit was added . Otherwise, the power output of the generating unit must be zero.
2) A MILP Reformulation of PSIP: Bilevel programs like (8) cannot be solved directly. One approach is to reformulate the bilevel program by dualizing the inner minimization problem.
For fixed values of , the inner minimization problem is a linear program that is always feasible. By strong duality and combining the upper level of (8), we can reformulate the bilevel program as a single level bilinear program, where the objective of the dualized problem contain terms associated with the product of the upper-level contingency selection variables and the lower-level dual variables associated with flow balance, transmission flow, transmission capacity, and generation capacity constraints. However, with additional variables and constraints, these bilinear terms can be linearized using the following strategy. Let and be continuous variables and . Letting , we introduce the following three constraints to linearize the bilinear term :
where parameter represents an upper bound for . Assessing these three constraints for both binary values of show that they indeed provide a valid linearization. If , then constraints (9b) and together imply that . With , constraints (9a) and (9c) together imply that , which are never binding. If , then constraints (9a) and (9c) together imply and constraints (9b) and implies , which is valid. We follow a similar strategy to linearize all five bilinear terms . Define continuous variables and let , and . Following the same linearization strategy of (9), we state the full mixed-integer linear PSIP formulation for completeness, which we call the mixed-integer power system inhibition problem, M-PSIP :
Linearization constraints for bilinear terms are
Next, we outline an algorithm for optimally solving problem (7) that combines a BD with the aid of an oracle given by (10) , which acts as a separation problem. A given capacity expansion is optimal if the oracle cannot find a contingency of size that results in a loss-of-load above the allowable threshold , for all . For each contingency budget , we can check for -element contingencies by solving M-PSIP using a failure budget of (i.e., the right-hand side of inequality (10b) is set to ). Whenever the oracle determines that the capacity expansion decision is not -compliant, it returns a contingency that results in a loss-of-load, above the allowable threshold for -element failures.
Let be the iteration number and let the initial RMP be problem (7) without any (7b) constraints. Let be a concatenation of the expansion variables in the th iteration.
Algorithm 2 Implicit Contingency Screening (ICS)
1: 2: Solve RMP for iteration 3: if RMP is infeasible 4: EXIT, TGEP is infeasible 5: else 6: Let be the optimal solution to RMP 7: for 8: Solve -, let be the objective value 9: and be the contingency selection decision 10: if then 11:
Solve , add feasibility cut (6) to RMP 12:
, go to step 2 13: end if 14: end for 15: end if 16: is optimal, EXIT At each iteration, either a contingency that results in loss-ofload above the allowable threshold is identified and a corresponding feasibility cut is generated and added to RMP, or no infeasible contingencies are found, which means that the current solution is optimal and the algorithm can terminate.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We implemented our proposed methods in C++ and CPLEX 12.4 via ILOG Concert Technology 2.9. All experiments were run on a machine with four quad-core 2.93-GHz Xeon processors and 96 GB of memory. For the experiments, a single CPU and 8 GB of RAM were allocated. The optimality gap was set to be 0.1% for CPLEX. We tested our models and algorithms on the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 57-bus systems. 1 To compare the different approaches, for each power system, we considered five different contingency budgets 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Table I presents the runtimes in CPU seconds for the three approaches for each of the ten instances. In this table, is the number of distinct contingencies, is the maximum contingency size, and is the maximum loss-of-load threshold.
The modified IEEE 30-bus system contained the existing set of generating units and transmission lines and, in addition, we replicated the set of existing system elements twice. This provides a large test system that has sufficient candidate elements to survive multiple-element failures for various loss-of-load thresholds, as prescribed by . For the IEEE 57-bus system, we replicated a subset of the transmission lines, replicated the set of existing generators twice, and added generators at buses 22, 25, 44, 47, and 55, to form the set of candidate elements. With these candidate elements in place, we iteratively solved the PSIP problem for the and values presented in Table I . In all ten instances, the values of were invariant, that is, for instance, when was chosen to be 2, 3, or 4. We want to emphasize that our contributions in this paper are in algorithmic fundamentals, and hence, the particular list of candidate elements and the selection of load shedding threshold values for a problem instance are not critical. However, we provide a detailed analysis of ICS runtimes as a function of various load shedding threshold values in Fig. 1 .
In Table I , NS and OM mean that the approach failed to complete at the end of the 2-h time limit and exited with a status of no solution and out-of-memory, respectively. Note that the first approach, the extensive form (EF), can only solve the smallest of instances. This is because of the sheer size of the problem, in which, for each contingency, a full DCOPF problem must be embedded in the formulation. As the number of contingencies grows, this formulation quickly becomes intractable. Note that we are working with moderate-sized data sets here and target systems will be in the order of thousands of elements, which will make EF intractable even sooner.
The second approach, BD, bypasses this problem via a Benders decomposition, with corresponding delayed cut  TABLE II  IEEE 30-BUS SOLUTIONS generation. However, this approach still suffers from the combinatorial growth in the number of contingency states-for each contingency, a subproblem (DSP) must be solved to check for violated feasibility cuts to add to the RMP. We see that larger problem instances can be solved, relative to EF, but the BD approach nonetheless cannot solve the larger problem instances. For IEEE 30-bus system with and IEEE 57-bus system with , BD failed to find optimal solutions within the 2-h time limit and exited with the associated feasibility gaps indicated by the parenthetical numbers. These numbers reflect the maximum loss-of-load fraction in the worst case contingency. For example, (0.266) indicates that for the IEEE 30-bus system, the final solution after 2 h has a maximum loss-of-load of 0.266 fraction of the total demand under the worst-case contingency of size 4.
With the ICS approach, we see that all instances of the problem can be solved, in most cases in under 30 min and frequently in only a few minutes. This is a result of the combination of the strength of the Benders cuts, enabling the problem to be solved in a relatively small number of iterations and the fact that we are able to implicitly evaluate the contingencies in order to identify a violated contingency and then quickly find its corresponding feasibility cut by solving a single linear program (DSP). The last two columns of Table I show the number of added transmission and generation elements for each instance.
In Table II , we present detailed solutions for the IEEE 30-bus system for values up to four. The "Generator locations" column displays the bus number of the new generators, while "Transmission lines" column shows the "from" and "to" bus numbers of the new transmission lines. Fig. 1 shows the solution for the IEEE-30 bus system for and . Observe that all load buses with demand greater than 0.02 fraction of the total load and that are also not generation buses must be at least connected, that is, there must be at last transmission lines connected to such buses. We can derive valid inequalities for RMP based on this observation to further improve convergence speed of ICS. Table III provides further evidence of the scalability of ICS. For each instance, we see the total number of possible contingency states and then the number of contingency states for which corresponding feasibility cuts were actually generated, denoted by "cont." in the table. Clearly, it is a small fraction of the possible number of contingencies, which is critical to the tractability of the approach. The remaining columns of this table breakdown the total runtime by time spent on the three components of the algorithm: the RMP, which identifies a candidate network design, the M-PSIP, which identifies a contingency that cannot be overcome by the current network design, and the dual subproblem (DSP), which generates the feasibility cuts.
Finally, we present a detailed analysis of ICS runtimes as a function of the load shedding threshold vector . For each value of 2, 3, and 4, we start by setting for all , that is, we require a feasible DCOPF to exist for all contingencies of size less than without load shedding. Then, given a fixed , we vary by increments of 0.01 for and increments of 0.05 for and increments of 0.1 for . In all we solved 120 instances to generate Fig. 2 .
This figure shows that ICS runtime increases as increases and as we increasingly restrict the system to very small loss-ofload thresholds.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the transmission and generation expansion problem with contingency constraints. We investigated the problem of improving a power system at a minimum cost by adding generators and transmission lines, such that it satisfies the -survivability criterion. This survivability criterion is a generalization of the well-known criterion, and it requires that at least fraction of the total demand is met even after failures of any system components, for all . This design problem adds another level of complexity to the contingency analysis problem, since the contingency analysis is only one of the constraints in the design optimization problem. We proposed two algorithms: one is based on the Benders decomposition, and the other is based on implicit contingency screening. The latter approach avoids the combinatorial explosion by seeking vulnerabilities in the intermediary solution and generates constraints to exclude such infeasible solutions. We tested our proposed approaches on the IEEE 30-bus and the IEEE 57-bus systems. Computational results show the proposed ICS algorithm, which uses a bilevel separation technique to implicitly consider all exponential number of contingencies, significantly outperforms a standard Benders decomposition. We were able to solve most instances in our experiment in under 30 min, while the extensive form and the Benders Decomposition algorithm failed to complete at the end of 2 h.
We believe that this paper will provide fundamentals for further work in contingency-aware transmission and generation expansion. As an example, we want to apply our methods to full-scale systems. While our results are promising in terms of scalability, full-scale problems will require high performance computing resources. Also our current model assumes all failures happen simultaneously. To reflect practical operational situations, where failures may happen consecutively, models that consider timing between system element failures are needed. Additionally, unit commitment and de-commitment is not considered in our current model. We plan to extend our models to consider these cases. Finally, we worked with a deterministic model, and it is essential to take stochasticity into account for planning problems. We believe our current framework can be naturally extended for stochastic problems.
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